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ABSTRACT
This investigation has attempted to provide a current estimate
of the oil potential of the northern North Sea from which estimates of
exploration investment, development investment, and accruing cash-flows
can be derived. Current proven reserves are estimated at 29.4 billion
barrels oil equivalent, of which 22.6 billion barrels are oil. Of the
59 discoveries documented, 8 can be classed as true gas accumulations.
Undiscovered potential for the area of study is estimated at 24.3
billion barrels, giving a most probable ultimate recoverable reserve of
53.7 billion barrels oil equivalent. Depending on minimum commercial
field size, recoverable oil reserves should vary between 33.7 and 39.2
billion barrels.
Current development of 14.8 billion barrels of recoverable oil
involves an estimated capital investment of $16.8 billion dollars. Peak
daily production is estimated to occur in 1981 at 4.12 million barrels
daily. An additional 4.6 billion barrels of recoverable oil is in
various stages of evaluation and will probably be developed, yielding a
total of 19.4 billion barrels of reserves and a total peak production of
4.95 million barrels per day in 1981. Capital investment is estimated
at $27 billion dollars for the total.
In order to develop current plus discovered plus future discover-
ies, private industry is estimated to require between $56 and $70 billion
dollars. Most of this investment, including approximately $6 billion
additional outlay for exploration, is anticipated to occur between now
and 1985. Peak production of 6.58 to 7.85 million barrels per day is
estimated to occur around 1986, representing a total reserve development
of approximately 34.4 to 38.4 billion barrels of oil. Private industry
is anticipated to earn between $30 and $56 billion dollars whereas
government take, assuming a lower discount rate, is estimated to run
between $83 and $222 billion dollars.
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Critical to this analysis are assumptions about host-government
tax policy and the world price of crude oil, especially as pertaining
to "marginal" North Sea fields. Utilizing an econometric model developed
by the Supply Analysis Group of the M.I.T. World Oil Project, investi-
gation of discounted cash-flow profiles for various field sizes indicates
that access to crude supply and development of subsequent discoveries
appear to be the primary economic incentives for continuing to operate
smaller fields after peak production is obtained. Tax policy and high
operating costs relative to productive capacity tend to make small fields
less attractive investments. Finally, it is patently obvious that very
high per-well productivity is essential for viable development of North
Sea fields under current economic, political, fiscal, and technical
constraints.
Thesis Supervisor: Morris A. Adelman'
Title: Professor of Economics
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INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I
Petroleum exploration can be characterized as being related to
the willingness of investors to participate in high-risk, large invest-
ments, with long-term exposure to financial loss. The objectives of
this study are to analyze a currently active exploration arena, the
northern North Sea, in terms of economic return to the petroleum
industry as well as to the host government. In order to do so, three
main factors must be evaluated: (1) estimation of current North Sea
petroleum reserves as well as future discoveries, (2) economic analysis
of current industry investment in the North Sea, and (3) estimation of
future industry investment as based upon current expectations of
profitability.
The estimation of current reserves and future discoveries is
based on a complex source of published information, personal communi-
cations, analytical approaches, and geological insight furnished by
the writer. A perspective on the Exploration Process is furnished to
the interested reader as a means of better understanding the approach
utilized.
Central to the study is a computational scheme developed by
Eckbo which takes current estimates of investment costs, reserves,
and accessory parameters, and calculates cash-flow to the private
company and to the host-government on a yearly basis. Separate discount
rates can be utilized, and figures for both Norway and the U.K. are
automatically printed out. This tool was utilized for various
-9-
sensitivity tests as well as to develop a numerical basis for the
minimum field size required for development, as discussed in Chapter IV.
The area of study is confined to a geographic area between 560
and 62 North latitude, the offshore boundary between Norway and
Denmark, and published geologic features as shown in figure 1. A
discussion of the criteria utilized to delimit the area of study is
contained in Chapter II. It should be pointed out at the outset that
this area is commonly considered to represent the "oil area" of the
North Sea by industry writers.
Although not included herein, this investigation was originally
conceived as a systems dynamics analysis of industry investment where
manipulation of government policy, eg. tax policy, as well as imposed
price and supply controls, various government participation schemes,
and other elements of potential impact on industry investment could be
evaluated. As work progressed, however, it became evident that
considerable additional work would be required in order to include
such an nalysis. Nevertheless, a number of conclusions regarding such
elements as described above will be offered in the final chapter, as
derived from the contained analysis. Further work on this aspect of
the investigation should be undertaken by subsequent writers.
-10-
EXPLORATION IN THE NORTH SEA
CHAPTER II
A. A Perspective on the Exploration Process
During the early history of petroleum exploration, considerable
amounts of commerical hydrocarbons were in "large" structures which
were obvious on the basis of very limited information. As geological
and geophysical tools became more sophisticated, the amount of
commercial oil discovered by such advanced tools also increased.
"Wildcatting" slowly gave way to technology and organizational decision-
making. Likewise, the evoling geological and geophysical skills have
converged towards a focused approach in petroleum exploration. Thus a
"petroleum explorationist" is described variously as capable of
synthesizing the complex exploration data currently available to the
point of assessing probability of encountering commercial quantities
of hydrocarbons on a "prospect".
Technology has continued to expand until today we stand on the
thresh-hold of a new era in petroleum exploration. The complexity of
processing overwhelming masses of data associated with current
exploration has led to the development of a new type of decision-making.
This is compounded by the fact that over large segments of the world,
many of the large structures have been drilled, and decisions as to
deployment of resources are no longer obvious. Disregarding for the
moment the difficulty of assessing the external environment in which
he must work, the modern explorationist remains primarily technologically
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oriented and will probably tend to become more so. Thus decisions
regarding exploration will necessarily involve a broader organizational
element than in the past. Communication between the explorationist and
the economist or politician or engineer will have to improve in order
for the exploration process to continue. The following paragraphs
attempt to facilitate that understanding.
An exploratory "prospect" is basically conceptual, in that
there exists a considerable latitude of prospect quality between
operators in terms of creative input and sound geological processes.
Within a basin, the problem of what comprises a prospect is strongly
affected by the stage of exploration maturity, operating limitations,
and the explorationist's perception of prospect composition. It is
often observed that a large number of characteristics can be elucidated
which are common for most fields within any one "play". Furthermore,
it should be obvious that, beyond any communality of geologic parameters
among oil fields, sheer size of reserves can easily demonstrate that
particular basins of the world are much more prolific than others.
The most critical parameters vary from prospect to prospect,
but fundamental to all are considerations as to size, both areally and
vertically. The distribution of reservoir thicknesses, hydrocarbon-
generating potential, and trapping mechanisms are undoubtedly lognormal
and finite. Thus many prospects, purely on the basis of size, will not
be drilled in an environmentally difficult area like the North Sea
where minimum expectations require large reserves for development.
This makes it difficult to explore for stratigraphic accumulations or
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test stratigraphic concepts unless they happen to coincide with large
structural anomalies.
The ability to accurately interpret the "true state of nature"
in light of real constraints on data quality and a clear understanding
of processes at work is no where more apparent than in petroleum
exploration.2 Our ability to evaluate risk or probability of success
for the purposes of arriving at decisions, eg. to invest or not to
invest, lies at the core of the competitive process. Each entity
interprets and converts any given set of data to its own investment
decisions. Those interpretations of geological and geophysical data
are the subjective deduction of individual's ideas as to what the basic
data mean. Interpretations often turn out to be in error, as evidenced
by a large number of dry blocks for which funds have been expended in
order to evaluate invalid interpretations.
The preceeding can be summarized by saying that a so-called
"high-risk industry" operates with a highly subjective decision-making
process, especially in termL of exploratory investment decisions. If
that risk is not rewarded then the risk will not be taken. Exploration
and development must be a function of cost and resource availability.
The said costs also pertain to greater conservation, trade imbalances,
environmental costs, costs attendent to diminishing reserves, and cost
of converting various resources to usable energy forms in an acceptable
way.
A large number of long-standing contractural arrangements and
resources have been expended towards gathering data pertaining to
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various offshore areas. A company often chooses to participate with
others in joint ventures in order to share technical expertise and
spread financial resources among a number of potential prospects rather
than concentrating on a few. Jointly owned properties afford partici-
pation in more drilling and exposure to a variety of prospect types.
Furthermore, by sharing the burden, necessary financial resources
required for rapid development can be obtained. By way of illustration,
consider a company in two situations: (1) operating a small area of
acreage on 100 percent exposure, and (2) operating an area three times
the previous size with an exposure of 33.3 percent. Assume that field
size is log-normal within the basin, anl that only some finite
percentage of any acreage will be prospective. This allows the company
under condition 2 above a greater probability of finding a larger than
normal field. Furthermore, exposure to unanticipated success in
unknown reservoirs is also greater. As shown in subsequent sections
of this thesis, the larger fields are also the more profitable fields,
and the iscovery rate is not as critical to success as is the
recoverable reserve size.
B. Estimation of North Sea Reserves
As shown in figure 1, the area of study, hereafter called the
Area, has been delimited on the basis of exploration parameters which
consist of: 1) selected depth contours on the base of the Paleocene,3' 4
2) the primary structural elements of the North Sea,3 ' 4 '5 3) discussions
with explorationists and data from the literature,6' 7 and 4) geopolitical
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considerations. The Area is defined between 56° and 620 North
latitude, the boundary of Norway and Denmark, and the zero Paleocene
depth contour. Areas outside these approximate boundaries are
considered poorly to non-prospective for the purposes of this investi-
gation.
The various depth contours and structural elements define a
central North Sea graben or down-faulted.trough which generally contains
the thickest sedimentary section, particularly of post-Jurassic
sediments. It is this sedimentary section which contains most of the
currently-known reserves. Production presently derives from three main
horizons/intervals: 1) Tertiary Paleocene sands, (eg. Forties and Frivg),
2) Danian reservoirs, (Ekofisk complex), and 3) the major Jurassic
producing horizon of the North Sea, (eg. Statfjord, Brent, and Piper).
Although the main productive horizons are geologically distinctive,
it is considered impractical, for the purposes of this study, to attempt
to identify separate potential fairways within the Area. Of the three
horizons, the Ekofisk-type production appears to be limited most
specifically to the deeply buried central basin. The reader is therefore
advised that this latter region has the greatest Danian potential
although statistical treatment to follow does not differentiate.
The Area, (figure 1), has been further differentiated into an
"optimal or prime trend" and a "less prospective trend". While a dis-
cussion of the geologic basis for this differentiation is beyond the
scope of this paper, it can be noted that the discovery rate within
the prime trend of 24 percent is substantially better than the 6
percent rate within the less prospective trend. Finally, the
-16-
boundary between the two trends is rather arbitrary in the southern
part of the area of study, and is placed on the basis of the -3000 feet
contour on the base of the Paleocene.3'4'5
At this stage of exploration, the northern North Sea has reached
an intermediate stage of exploration evaluation. Considerable amounts
of seismic data of post-1970 vintage are now available over the entire
area of interest. This data, in conjunction with geologic data derived
from boreholes and field studies, comprises the main body of data on
which new prospects are generated.
Since the larger structures are finite in number and generally
known, the question can be asked, "have they all been drilled?" This
writer would suggest that the answer is no, purely on the basis that
some areas may be characterized by data such that the true structural/
stratigraphic picture has not been developed. At the same time, it
appears unlikely that there are many such large anomalies, as evidenced
by a prospect portfolio made available to this writer where the
largest rospect has a potential for only 600 million barrels.
At the same time, additional drilling on large structures which
do not, at the present time, appear to contain commercially large
reserves will undoubtedly discover unanticipated new reserves in some
instances. This was true in the Ekofisk area, is proving to be true
in the Beryl and Brent area, and will surely hold in other areas. Such
discoveries are not true exploration discoveries, but neither are they
delineation discoveries.
Table 1 shows current assessment of recoverable reserves in the
-17-
TABLE I
NORTHERN NORTH SEA DISCOVERIES
Order of Field Name or Spud Date Cumulative Recoverable Reserves
Discovery Location Wildcats Oil Equiv. (oil)
1 -------Cod--------- 2/68----------16----------59--------(25)
2 Montrose 4/69 31 200 (200)
3 Ekofisk 9/69 46 1932 (1060)
4 Josephine 6/70 52 250 (250)
5 Tor 8/70 55 245 (150)
6 Eldfisk 8/70 56 927 (500)
7 Forties 8/70 58 1800 (1800)
8 W. Ekofisk 8/70 60 706 (350)
9 Auk 9/70 64 50 (50)
10 ------ Frigg ------------- 4/71------- 70---------1264--------(0)
11 Brent 5/71 72 2375 (1750)
12 Argyll 6/71 74 75 (75)
13 Bream 12/71 89 75 (75)
14 Lomond 2/72 95 500 (500)
15 S.E. Tor 4/72 96 34 (25)
16 Beryl 5/72 100 550 (550)
17 Cormorant 6/72 103 400? (400)?
18 Edda 6/72 104 126 (55)
19 Heimdal 7/72 107 414 (23)
20-------Albuskjell--------7/72--- 109----------560--------(150)
21 Thistle 7/72 111 450 (450)
22 Piper 11/72 123 800 (800)
23 Maureen 11/72 124 500 (500)
24 vunlin 4/73 138 400 (400)
25 3/15-2 4/7.3 141 150 (150)
26 Hutton 7/73 153 300 (300)
27 Alwyn 7/73 154 500 (500)
28 E. Frigg 8/73 157 623 (0)
29 Heather 8/73 159 150 (150)
30 Brisling----------8/73---------160----------75--------(75)
31 Ninian 9/73 163 1200 (1200)
32 Statfjord 12/73 178 4595 (3900)
33 Odin 12/73 181 178 (0)
34 Bruce 3/74 188 450 (450)
35 Magnus 4/74 190 1080 (1080)
36 N.E. Frigg 4/74 191 71 (0)
37 Balder 4/74 193 100 (100)
38 Andrew 4/74 195 ? ?
39 Claymore 4/74 196 400 (400)
40 E. Magnus ---------6/74 ---- 208----------250-------- (250)
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TABLE I - Continued
Order of Field Name or Spud Date Cumulative Recoverable Reserves
Discovery Location Wildcats Oil Equiv.(oil)
41 -------9/13-4 --- 6/74---------210---------220------(220)%
42 15/6-1 9/74 223 150 (150)
43 Brae 9/74 226 185 (185)
44 Slpipner 9/74 227 50 (0)
45 Hod 11/74 237 75 (75)
46 211/27-3 11/74 238 450 (450)
47 Gudrun 11/74 239 450 (0)
48 2/10-1 11/74 240 100 (100)
49 3/4-4 12/74 244 100 (100)
50-------14/20-1---1/75 ---- 245----------75------(75)
51 Crawford 1/75 246 150 (150)
52 9/13-7 1.75 247 350 (350)
53 3/8-3 1.75 248 100 (100)
54 Tern 2/75 249 175 (175)
55 21/2-1 2/75 254 175 (175)
56 3/2-1A 3/75 260 200 (200)
57 Valhalla 4/75 264 50 (50)
58 3/4-6&3/9-1 200 (200)
59 15/13-2 200 (200)
60 ------- 211/26-4 175 ....(175)
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boundary between, along with order of discovery, field name, spud date,
and number of wildcats spudded up to that time. Gas reserves have
been converted to oil-equivalent values using a conversion factor of
1 Trillion cubic feet of gas equals 178 million barrels of oil.
Examination of the table would seem to indicate a more or less
random distribution of large-reserve discoveries. It should be noted
that the record for 1975 is somewhat incomplete. Revision should not
greatly affect the conclusions drawn herein. Classification of an
announced discovery as "significant" is highly subjective during the
early phases of evaluation in most instances. Table I is complicated
by inclusion of some discoveries which undoubtedly are not commercial
in themselves and exclusion of dry holes which "discovered" small
accumulations. At the same time, in order to fully evaluate the
amount of discovered hydrocarbons currently known as well as to be
discovered, it appears important to assess the amount present in
accumulations down to 50 million barrels in size. Current proven
reserves are estimated at 29.369 billion barrels oil equivalent, of
which 22.648 billion barrels, or 77.1 percent, is oil. Of the 59
discoveries, 8 of the discoveries can be classified as true gas
accumulations with very little associated liquid.
Figure 2 illustrates the reserve data plotted cumulatively in
terms of reserves and in terms of discovery size class. Note that both
distributions are good approximations of a log-normal distribution as
would be predicted by Kaufman. The mean discovery size is 230 million
barrels recoverable whereas the mean reserve size is significantly
-20-
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larger at 498 million barrels. These data are illustrated more
graphically in figure 3. Some 37 percent of the discoveries contain
64 percent of the total reserves. The largest discovery, Statfjord,
represents over 15 percent of the total North Sea reserves. From these
data one could estimate that the probability of discovery of another
Ekofisk is very low, (less than 5 percent), whereas the probability of
encountering fields in the 500 million to 1 billion barrel class is
relatively high. The following section discusses this aspect in more
detail.
C. A Postulated Discovery Process
A number of approaches to estimation of undiscovered reserves
have been advanced over the years and will not be reviewed here. In
order to make such an estimation, one must make assumptions as to the
likely drilling activity for some future period, the probability of
success, the size of reserves discovered thus serving as an economic
index of opportunity. Environmental factors, such as high cost or
political stability, may impact both drilling activity and required
reserve size.
The work of Kaufman, et al.8 9 has clearly been the most useful
approach to prediction of future reserves, in that it attempts to
predict discovery size as well as ultimate reserve addition. A key
element in their model is a set of probabilistic assumptions which
govern the behavior of additions to oil/gas in place as a function of
the number of wells drilled. The postulates they utilize are:
-22-
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1) "the size distribution of petroleum deposits in pools within a sub-
population is lognormal", 2) "within a subpopulation, the probability
of the "next" discovery will be of a given size is equal to the ratio
of that size to the sum of sizes of as-yet-undiscovered pools within
the subpopulation". The model essentially predicts that the largest
pools will be discovered early, leading to a decline in average size as
exploration proceeds. Although the analytical approach used by Barouch
and Kaufman9 is not utilized here, work in progress appears promising
in developing a more elegant analytical tool for such prediction.
The approach utilized here is to take a more subjective approach.
Utilizing the log-normal distribution of North Sea discoveries to-date,
and making assumptions as to the probability of discovering general
size classes of recoverable reserves, it then became necessary to
estimate industry activity and perception of opportunity over the next
decade. The first step thus became an analysis of past discovery
success rates, the amount of prospective acreage remaining and undrilled,
and potei.Lial impact of exploration costs.
Within the prime trend, approximately 51 discoveries were made
with a wildcat effort of 210 wells. The less prospective area yielded
only 3 discoveries out of 49 attempts. Success rates of 24 and 6 per-
cent are thus derived from this data. The average success rate is
21 percent for all 259 wildcats. An independent assessment by CONOCO
personnel estimates 31 "commercial" discoveries out of 139 attempts,
for a success rate of 22 percent.7
An inventory of acreage within the designated area of
-24-
investigation has been assembled in Table II. Note that Norway blocks,
due to their larger size, have been converted to U.K. size for purposes
of analysis. The total number of blocks, (U.K. size), is 995 Within
the prime area of exploration, there are 431 blocks. Industry has held
some 358 blocks, with subsequent relinquishment of 50 blocks, and
currently holds approximately 308 blocks. Within the less prospective
area, there are approximately 564 blocks. Industry has held approxi-
mately 153 blocks, with subsequent relinquishment of 51 blocks. Of the
blocks currently held, 75 percent are in the prime area and 25 percent
in the less prospective area, a significant change from the original
holding of 70 percent and 30 percent rspectively. This trend will
continue, as most of the prime acreage in U.K. waters is held by
industry. Norway, by way of contrast, still has some 62 blocks
considered to lie in the prime area which have never been awarded. An
additional 12 blocks of the industry sector are held by the Norwegian
national oil company, Statoil.
in order to estimate the undiscovered potential of industry held
acreage, it has been necessary to establish what percentage of that
acreage is considered "prospective" under current industry interpreta-
tion. One approach utilizes the concept of a prospect "portfolio"
wherein a typical company holds interests in 18 blocks within the area
of study7 Some 40 percent, or 7 blocks, are not currently considered
prospective, whereas the remaining 11 blocks are interpreted to have a
mean potential of 500 million barrels per block, (with a standard
deviation of 415 million barrels). This distribution of potential
-25-
TABLE II
NORTH SEA EXPLORATION ACREAGE
A. On the basis of Host-Government:
PRIME AREA
U.K. Norway
Blocks Never Awarded--------------------------------
Blocks Relinquished by Industry---------------------
Blocks Retained by Industry-------------------------
TOTALS
* includes Statoil
11
13
215
239
LESS PROSPECTIVE AREA
Blocks Never Awarded-------------------------------
Blocks Relinquished by Industry---------------------
Blocks Retained by Industry-------------------------
TOTALS
U.K.
222
12
48
282
62
37
93*
192
Norway
189
39
54
282
B. On the Basis of Acreage-Type and Combined Host-Government:
PRIME AREA LESS PROSPECTIVE
Blocks Held by Industry--------------------
Blocks Relinquished by Industry------------
Blocks Retained by Industry----------------
TOTALS
C. Prime Area Discovery Rate =
Less Prospective Area Rate =
Conglomerate Discovery Rate =
308
50
73
102
51
411
431 564
.24
.06
.21
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reserve size is very comparable to the distribution of reserve size
shown in figure 2. Furthermore, there are no prospects in the portfolio
which fall in the less prospective area. Utilizing this type of
prospect distribution as typical for the region as a whole, we can
then attempt to ascertain hydrocarbon potential.
Using a mean block potential of 500 million barrels and 60
percent of the prime area blocks as prospective, applying the 24 percent
chance of discovery yields a potential of 22.5 billion barrels. The
less prospective area is more difficult to estimate. If we apply the
same criteria to this acreage with a 6 percent chance of discovery, we
gain another 1.8 billion barrels, for a total of 24.3 billion barrels
of undiscovered reserves. Addition of this figure to current reserves
of 29.369 billion barrels yields an ultimate potential of 53.669
barrels. The assumptions that the relatively high success rate will
continue without decline into the future and that the less prospective
area contains a relatively high percentage of prospects appears un-
realistic, however. It is a commonly observed fact that discovery
rates decline over time, along with mean field size.
One can attempt to evaluate host-government-retained acreage
utilizing comparable criteria. There are 73 prime area blocks, mostly
in Norwegian waters, which would thus have a potential for 5.3 billion
barrels. Assuming that the relatively large amount of acreage in the
less prospective area, currently held by government, contains an
estimated 10 percent prospective possibility, we can add another 1.2
billion barrels potential. We can thus derive a total grand ultimate
-27-
potential for the North Sea of 60.2 billion barrels oil and gas. Using
the previously cited percentage of oil reserves, we derive 46.3 billion
barrels of oil reserves. As cited in Table III, however, this figure
should be taken as highly optimistic.
Table III compares other estimates of North Sea potential with
the current work. Ultimate reserves on the order of 40 to 50 billion
barrels do not appear to be unreasonable, although O'Dell cites a
significantly greater potential for the "Scottish sector" of the North
Sea.5 Finally, a figure of 53.669 billion barrels, as derived from the
following discussion, will be used as this writers' best estimate.
Reasoning is as follows.
An essential input required for this investigation was derivation
of anticipated field size, on a year by year basis, assuming a finite
number of prospects remain to be evaluated. Within the prime area,
there are 308 blocks, 61 percent of which are prospective, with a 24
percent chance of discovery, yielding 45 potential discoveries. The
less prospective area might ield anoti.ar 4 discoveries, and a total of
approximately 49 discoveries of roughly 250 prospects drilled. Current
estimates of 1976 exploratory rig activity are based on announced
drilling plans utilizing approximately 20 rigs, down 10 rigs from
7
previous years. This translates into approximately 80 exploratory wells
during 1976. In order to relate this to exploratory activity as used
in this study, it is necessary to separate wildcat activity from
"infield" exploratory activity. Based on prior statistics, it would
appear that about 50 percent of the so-called exploratory wells are
-28-
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truly wildcats, the remainder being "significant" extensions or infield
delineation wells across block boundaries from prior discoveries.
A drilling rate of 40 wildcats per year would require approximately
6.3 years in order to drill 250 wildcats, yielding about 8 discoveries
per year. If we apply judgment and assume that the discovery rate will
decline over time, a discovery table such as shown in Table IV can be
derived. Using our previously cited discovery data, 24.3 billion
barrels reserves would be discovered with 49 discoveries. As noted in
Table IV, this reduces to 18.8 billion barrels oil in 43 discoveries.
Some 15.6 billion barrels of reserves would be found in 18 of the
discoveries. Utilizing a non-rigorous approach to distribution of field
size in fields greater than 300 million barrels of oil, this writer
assigned 8 fields to the 500 million barrel class, 9 fields to a 1
billion barrel class, and 1 field of 2 billion barrels. As shown in
Tables IV and V, these field sizes form the basis for subsequent economic
analysis reported in subsequent sections of this thesis.
As shown in Table IV, the distribution of field sizes is randomly
distributed although biased towards the earlier years of exploration.
Thus the derived additions to reserves on a yearly basis reflect this
writer's anticipation of reduced success in 1980 and 1981. In order to
evaluate the plausibility of development of fields less than 300 million
barrels, 13 fields of the 200 million barrel class were distributed over
the 6 year period. This size class is one of convenience, since the
utilization of a larger number of smaller fields would have complicated
the necessary computations. As is shown in Table V, inclusion of fields
-- ---
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TABLE IV
PREDICTED DISCOVERIES - 1976 THROUGH 1981, NORTH SEA OIL
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 SUM
Discoveries 
Oil Discoveries--
# 60 x 106 bbls.-
#200 x 106 bbls.-
#500 x 106 bbls.-
# 1 x 109 bbls.--
# 2 x 109 bbls.--
Sum Reserves at
150 x 106 Minimum
Field Size-------
# Fields---------
Sum Reserves at
300 x 106 Minimum
Field Size-------
# Fields---------
10 9 8 8 7 7 49
9 8 7 7 6 6 43
2 2 2 2 2 2 12
3 2 2 2 2 2 13
1 2 1 2 1 1
1 2 2 1 2 1
0 0 1 0 0 0
8
9
1
2.1E 3.4E 4.9E 2.4E9 2.9E 1.9E9 17.6x10 BBLS
5 6 6 5 5 4 31
1.5E 3.OE 4.5E 2.OE 2.5E 1.5E 15.0x109 BBLS
2 4 4 3 3 2 18
RESERVES
24.3 x 109 bbls oil + gas
18.8 x 109 bbls oil
18.0 x 109 bbls oil > 150E6
9 bbls oil 615.6 x 10 bbls oil > 300E
# DISCOVERIES
49
43
31
18
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greater than or equal to 150 million barrels, (all of 200 million
barrels in the years post 1975), would increase the number of "commer-
cial" fields from 40 to 69, and the amount of recoverable oil reserves
from 33.69 billion barrels to 39.245 billion barrels, or some 16
percent of total recoverable oil reserves.
As previously discussed, it is this writer's opinion that the
North Sea is in "an intermediate stage of evaluation". As exploration
proceeds, one can assume that a transition into a "mature" stage of
exploratory activity will ensue. As illustrated by figure 4, we are
currently projecting an absolute discovery rate which captures remaining
potential reserves in a relatively short time. One might logically
assume that discovery rates will decline more rapidly than shown in
figure 4, thus yielding a lower absolute potential for the North Sea.
The subsequent scenarios should thus be considered as optimistic
evaluations of future potential for the North Sea. It should also be
pointed out that government-retained acreage is not included here or
in subsequent sections, duc to uncert inties regarding future release
of said acreage for industry exploration.
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CURRENT INDUSTRY INVESTMENT IN THE NORTH SEA
CHAPTER III
A. Introduction
There is only limited information available at the present time
concerning the number of projects, and their associated investments,
undergoing development in the North Sea. Published information con-
cerning capital expenditure and operating costs have been summarized
from consulting firms and published accounts. This writer presently
estimates that some 14.8 billion barrels recoverable oil reserves are
undergoing active development with an estimated capital investment of
$16.8 billion dollars. Peak daily production is estimated to occur in
1981 at 4.12 million barrels daily, which translates to a cost of
$4087./daily barrel of production without accounting for operating costs.
It can be further estimated that an additional 4.6 million barrels
of reserves are in various stages of evaluation and will probably be
developed. Addition of this development to the above would yield a
total of 19.4 billion barrels of reserves and a peak production of 4.95
million barrels per day in 1971 at a capital investment of $27.018 bil-
lion dollars. The higher cost of this latter production raises the over-
all cost per barrel of daily production to $5458.
The enormous expenditures by private industry cited here should
serve to dramatize the magnitude of capital investment in the North Sea.
Before entering into a detailed discussion of that investment and the
potential benefits to be derived, a brief discussion is inserted here
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on the costs of North Sea exploration as well as the operating environ-
ment. From this discussion it is hoped that a better understanding of
the exposure to risk by said private companies might be gained. Follow-
ing that discussion, sections of reserves and production forecasts,
investment costs, tax law and government policy, and a cash-flow analysis
will be presented.
B. North Sea Exploration Costs
There is no accurate way to establish total expenditure towards
exploration in the northern portion of the North Sea other than to
attempt to estimate the important components. Most of this information
comes from the literature or trade journals. Up to 1972, it was esti-
mated by Birks6 that some 625,000 miles of geophysical data in U.K.,
Norway and Dutch waters had been shot. Assuming approximately 60,000
miles/year as average acquisition since 1972, the total line mileage
through 1975 would be on the order of 800,000 miles. Excluding early
mileage devoted largely to the southern U.K. and Dutch gas area, mileage
in the northern areas is probably on the order of 600,000 line miles
as a conservative estimate. The acquisition and process cost of these
data would thus be on the order of $120 million dollars, with geophysi-
cal interpretation and additional processing of another $120. million.
Geological interpretation expenditures would account for an estimated
$60 million dollars or more, thus bring total geological/geophysical
costs to approximately $300 million dollars. On the basis of the num-
ber of blocks drilled to date, the average expenditure per block is
approximately $600 thousand dollars.
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By the end of 1975, it has been estimated that some 562 exploration
and delineation wells had been drilled where oil was the primary objec-
tive. Assuming that at least a portion of these oil programmed wells
were drilled in the gas fields of the northern area, we can estimate
that at least 520 wells should logically be allocated towards the "oil
play" of the northern area. Using a current figure of $4.6 million per
well plus a 10 percent management overhead fee to account for research
and development costs, we arrive at a figure of $3 billion dollars plus
as the industry exploration expenditure.
If we use the above approach as a basis for estimating expenditures
over the ext five years, total industry outlay for exploration could
easily approach $6 billion dollars. Assuming some 250 wildcats dis-
cover 18 commercial fields requiring 6 wells each to delineate, we can
easily project costs of 1.6 billion dollars. Another 13 fields of smaller
size would require an additional $360 million dollars to evaluate.
Recent escalation of geophysical and geological costs, for which I have
no current estimates, would thus bring the total cost to aproximatejv
$2.5 to $3. billion dollars.
Exploration costs have not been included in the development out-
lays of the projects analyzed. Present values of the discounted cash-
flows for each project should, therefore, exceed the average exploration
expenditure for each project. There are currently 22 fields which
appear to be conmmercially viable. The average industry expenditure to
date is thus $136 million dollars per project although not all fields
are thoroughly delineated. Alternatively, one can estimate that an
expenditure of $600,000 for geophysics and geology along with an average
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6 exploration/delineation wells at $4.6 million per well yields a minimum
exploration expenditure of approximately $30. million dollars.
C. The North Sea Environment and Cost Escalation
The North Sea represents one of the most severe marine environments
yet encountered by the petroleum industry. As might be expected, early
designs and construction-cost estimates were, in retrospect, highly
optimistic. Subsequent high rates of inflation, lack of construction
capacity, shortages of drilling and construction materials, and labor
problems led to higher investment and operating costs as development
plans proceeded. It is now anticipated that inflation rates in the
North Sea sector will moderate during the next years. Reduced pressures
on available resources resulting from the present recession, anticipated
slowdown in North Sea drilling activity, and construction capacity
catching up with demand should account for most of the reduction.
The cost data cited in the following sections represents estimates
of inflation on all post-1975 outlays. The figures used were 30 percent
for 1975, 25 percent for 1976, 20 percent for 1977, and 10 percent for
all years thereafter. The use of inflated costs for the analysis repre-
sents this writer's conservative approach plus a lack of confidence that
the acquired cost figures had been treated consistently. This problem
will be discussed further in the Chapter on Minimum Field Size Required
for Development where cost data is most critical.
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D. Current Development Capital Investment
As documented in Appendix I, cost data for 15 development pro-
jects have been used for the initial analysis. These projects repre-
sent oil development only. Total capital investment ranges from $280
million in the Montrose Field to $3.5 billion at Statfjord. Cost data
is shown as (1) platform and installation costs, (2) platform equipment
costs, (3) development drilling costs, and (4) transportation and pipe-
line costs, which include onshore terminal costs. Miscellaneous costs
have been arbitrarily allocated almost entirely to platform and instal-
lation costs. Miscellaneous costs generally run about 3 percent of
total investment.
Large projects such as Ekofisk and Forties, which had an early
start-up in terms of North Sea development, have relatively low costs
as compared to later projects. If these projects were translated into
1976 dollars the converse would be true. The Ekofisk development is
probably the most expensive development of the entire North Sea when
viewed in that context.
Total operating costs vary between approximately $40 million
dollars per year for the smaller projects to $165 million per year for
Statfjord. As shown in Appendix I, operating costs are broken down into
platform operating and transportation operating costs.
Standard investment and production profiles, expressed as a per-
centage per year since discovery, were used for all analyses undertaken
in this study. As shown in Table VI, all fields with reserves less than
300 million barrels use a six year profile for investment, whereas the
larger fields use a nine-year profile. Production profiles range from a
-39-
TABLE VI
Investment and Production Profiles, North Sea
Investment Profiles: (CIPFL)
"Small" (<300E6) "Large" (>300E6)
Year 1 .04 Year 1 .04
Year 2 .44 Year 2 .12
Year 3 .27 Year 3 .20
Year 4 .11 Year 4 .24
Year 5 .08 Year 5 .16
Year 6 .06 Year 6 .07
Year 7 .06
Year 8 .06
Year 9 .05
Production Profiles (PNPFL):
RESV < 300E6 300E6 to 1500E6 > 1500 E6
Year 1 .09 .03 .01
2 .13 .08 .04
3 .15 .10 .06
4 .13 .11 .09
5 .13 .10 .10
6 .11 .10 .10
7 .08 .10 .10
8 .06 .10 .10
9 .05 .08 .10
10 .03 .06 .08
11 .02 .05 .07
12 .02 .04 .05
13 0 .03 .03
14 0 .02 .03
15 0 0 .02
16 0 0 .01
17 0 0 .01
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12 year profile for small fields to a 14 year profile for fields in the
300 to 1500 million barrel range, and a 17 year profile for large fields.
The only exception to this practice was the Thistle Field, where an ab-
normally rapid production profile of 7 years was used. Such a high rate
of extraction may be unrealistic in view of the rates projected by
other operators in the area. Figure 5 illustrates approximate timing
of investment and production relative to year of discovery. Timing
for current development projects is given in Appendix I.
E. Computation of Taxes and Government Policy
Both Norway and the United Kingdom have recently enacted new tax
laws to increase government take from anticipated North Sea production.
After describing the laws for the two countries, which have quite com-
parable effects on cash-flow, a brief discussion of government partici-
pation and potential future changes in tax policy are included. Bonus
payments and various types of fees have not been included in the dis-
cussion or the analysis. Bonus payments for North Sea blocks have not
been used extensively, and various license fees do not approach the mag-
nitude or importance of costs considered herein.
United Kingdom:
13
The new tax laws became effective in November of 1974. The
government revenues are comprised of the following measures: (1) royalty
payments, (2) petroleum revenue tax, (P.R.T.), and (3) corporate tax.
Royalty is calculated as a percentage of gross oil production on
a per field basis. The current rate is 12.5 percent. The Energy
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Ministry has the power to refund royalty wholly or in part, presumably
during periods of emergency. "Emergency" could be construed as a period
of low crude prices or operator distress from adversity.
The Petroleum Revenue Tax considers that an investment fence ex-
tends around each field, and includes pipelines and terminal facilities
allocated to that field. A "fence" includes all areas within 5000 meters
of the field boundary. Exploration or delineation costs, even if abor-
tive, are allowed as expense if within this fence with "uplift" on
investment.
Field by field computation of P.R.T. is required, thus current
losses on one field cannot be offset against profits on another field.
P.R.T. is payable at 45 percent of corporate taxable income on each
field reduced by the following deductions:
1) Investment is multiplied by an "uplift" factor of 1.75 for the
putpose of calculating taxable income.
2) The operator receives an oil allowance or the cash equivalent of
7.3 n.llion barrels of oil per year of production subject to
(a) 73 million barrels maximum over the field life, (b) a carry-
forward of unused amounts but still subject to 7.3 million barrels
per year maximum deduction, and (c) the allowance does not start
until uplift on the investment has been recovered.
3) The maximum P.R.T. liability in any year is 80 percent of the dif-
ference between the taxable income for P.R.T. before oil allowance,
and 30 percent of investment.
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4) Interest costs are not allowed as expense for P.R.T. calculations.
5) P.R.T. is not payable on gas fields with signed contracts to the
British Gas Corporation as of June 30, 1975.
6) Although not in the legislation, it is apparently the government's
intention that the rate of P.R.T. can/will be changed if crude
prices change substantially in real terms. P.R.T. can thus be
construed as an excess profits tax.
The Corporate Tax computation is relatively straight-forward and
payable at a rate of 52 percent subject to the following deductions.
The tax rate is legislated on a yearly basis.
1) Operating costs, royalty payments, interest costs, and P.R.T. are
fully deductible from revenue.
2) Depreciation is fully deductible and can be written off as incurred
if a tangible investment. Intangible investment is written off over
the project life.
3) Loss carry-forward is deductible and written off as fast as income
is available.
4) Deficits anywhere in the U.K. North Sea can be applied against in-
come in the North Sea, but not against onshore income. Deficits on-
shore can be applied against North Sea income. Corporate tax pay-
ment lags by one year whereas P.R.T. is paid as accrued. The tax
price of crude, (the Norm Price), will probably be set as equal
to the average U.K. North Sea realized price.
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Norway:
The new petroleum tax low became effective in January of 1975.13
The government revenues are comprised of the following measures:
(1) royalty payments, (2) corporation tax, (3) state tax, (4) local
tax, (5) special tax, (6) withholding (source) tax on distributed divi-
dends, and (7) capital tax. All taxes are deferred one year.
Royalty is calculated as a percentage of gross oil production on
a per field basis. For blocks allocated in the first licensing round,
the royalty is fixed at 10 percent. For all subsequently licensed
blocks, royalty is computed on the basis of production rates as follows:
40,000 barrels/day or less = 8 percent
40,000 to 100,000 bbls/day = 10 percent
100,000 to 225,000 = 12 percent
225,000 to 350,000 = 14 percent
350,000 and greater = 16 percent
Once the royalty rates reaches 12 percent, it does not decline with
subsequently lower production levels.
The Corporation Tax is payable at a rate of 50.8 percent on the
basis of revenue less operating costs, ryalty, depreciation, loss carry-
forward, interest costs, and distributed dividends. Payment is deferred
one year. Deductions are explained as follows:
1) Depreciation of production and transportation facilities will be
linearly over a period of six years from the year the plant was taken
into ordinary use, or when petroleum is produced.
2) Carried-forward losses can be deducted provided they arise from
offshore operations during the past 15 years. The losses must be
spread over a 3-year period on a straight-line basis. All offshore
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losses, if so required, can be offset against other company profits
derived from Norwegian activities. Only 50 percent of losses derived
from other Norwegian activities can be offset against offshore profits.
For purposes of calculation, we must ignore the possibility of external
losses in this study.
3) Interest costs may be deducted for computing taxable income whether
it is a parent company loan or a third-party loan. Interest is deduc-
tible for both corporate and special tax.
State tax is payable at a rate of 26.5 percent of net taxable
income less distributed dividends. Distributed dividends are available
earnings less tax liability, and will probably vary between 30 and 60
percent of net taxable income.
Local tax is computed as 24.3 percent of net taxable income.
The Special Tax can be essentially construed as an excess profits
tax. The special tax is computed at a rate of 25 percent of taxable
revenue less operating cost, royalty, intangibles expensed, depreciation,
interest, losses carried-forlard, and tx-free income. Tax free income
is 10 percent of tangible investment that has been put into operation in
the preceding 15 years but purchased prior to the end of the preceding
year. The unused portion may be carried forward.
The Withholding (source) Tax is computed on the basis of 10 per-
cent of distributed dividends. Payment is deferred one year.
The Capital Tax is calculated at a rate of 0.7 percent of the net
capital, (i.e. after depreciation where relevant), that the company is
carrying on its books. Taxable capital includes production, transport
and storage facilities as well as other equipment used in the company's
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activities. The same applies to stocks of products produced, securities
and bank deposits. The capital tax is not regarded as deductible in the
assessment of other taxes. Payment is deferred one year.
Participation and Government Policy:
In Norway waters, current government participation varies from 5
to 50 percent on selected blocks. The Ministry of Industry is attempt-
ing to work out a Norwegian standard contract with active government
participation for future awards. The government's share will vary from
20 to 50 percent, and will be exercised per discovery. Statoil will
not share in costs until a commercial discovery is made, and will take
its share in kind. The private participants will, in turn, have to
market Statoil's share if this is desirable. Current developments in
Norway indicate that Statoil intends to become an internationally inte-
grated oil company as rapidly as possible.
U.K. intentions regarding participation have been considerably
less aggressive as compared to Norway. Agreements reached to date pri-
marily involve loan guarantees on the part of the government in return
for agreements on an option to purchase a significant share of produc-
tion on a per field basis. The government has repeatedly emphasized
that private companies would be no better or no worse off than before
signing of participation agreements. One could interpret that the
main thrust of the participation agreements is to provide sharing of
risk in order to facilitate development of some of the smaller, possibly
marginal fields. Possibly the most significant effect of the government's
-47-
intention to push participation is the pronouncement that any new
licenses to be issued will require majority U.K. government participa-
tion in any discoveries as a condition of the license.
F. Cash-Flow Analysis of Current Development
Utilizing the computational program developed by Eckbo, a series
of discounted cash-flows to the private company and the host-government
have been generated for current oil field development projects. The
$7 price represents a conservative approach to evaluation in which the
price of crude can be construed as a constant price in current dollars
and a declining price in terms of real dollars. Costs, on the other
hand, can be thought of as constant in real terms, reflecting inflation
beyond worldwide inflation. For the two prices of crude, a discount
rate of 10 percent has been used both for the private sector and the
host-government. The resulting cash-flows thus represent accrual on
investment after worldwide inflation is removed. See Chapter IV for
further discussion. At the $7 price of crude, only fields greater than
300 million barrels recoverable reserves have been included in the sum-
mary, whereas fields down to 150 million barrels reserves have been
included in the $12 price scenario.
Table VII presents pertinent Present Values for the projects
studied. Results range from $5. billion to the company and $10.9 bil-
lion for the Norwegian government at the $12 price to $3. billion to
the company and $5.7 billion for the government for the Ekofisk complex.
Conversely, the Cormorant Field results range from $211 million to the
-48-
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company and $164 million to the U.K. government at the $12 price down
to $29 million for the company and $45 million for the government at
the $7 price.
Table VIII shows a summary of pertinent data for current develop-
ment under the two prices utilized.
TABLE VIII
SUMMARY OF PERTINENT DATA FOR CURRENT DEVELOPMENT
Price: $7 $12
Peak Production, millions bbls/day/year: 4.12(1981) 4.22(1981)
Total Reserves Developed, billions bbls: 14.8 15.1
Development Investment, $ billions: 16.84 17.8
Discounted Cash-Flow, $billions: 27(Co)-47.2(Gvt) 46.3(Co)-104.(Gvt)
It is readily observed that the higher price increases government take
relative to private company take. Figure 6 illustrates the basis for
this relationship, in that private company cash flow peaks rapidly in
the early years of production, declining rapidly as investment is
recovered. Government take, deferred until investment is recovered,
then dominates the remaining years of t project. At the $7 price,
discounted government take averages 64 percent, where as at the $12
price, discounted government take averages 69 percent.
In conclusion,analysis of cash-flow data from development currently
under way demonstrates a number of interesting relationships: (1) a
relatively high crude price is advantageous to all parties, (2) at a
price of $7./bbl., fields of less than 200 million barrels do not
appear attractive, (3) fields of 300 million barrels, e.g., Hutton,
have present values, at a 10 percent discount rate, close to the
-52-
industry average exploration outlay, and an overestimation of recoverable
reserves would reduce cash-flow to a net loss. Finally, it is readily
apparent that only in the larger fields will there be a net inflow of
cash in the latter years of a project which accrue to the private com-
pany. Two main factors are involved relative to the small field:
1) the volume allowance may not be fully utilized prior to P.R.T.
takeover due to limited production capacity of the field, and 2) oper-
ating costs, relative to production revenue obtained during subsequent
years, may not allow for a positive cash-flow to the private company.
Thus access to crude supply and development of subsequent discoveries
appear to be the only economic incentives for continuing to operate
the smaller fields after peak production is obtained.
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CHAPTER IV
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF NORTH SEA OIL
A. Introduction
After formulating an approach to estimation of future North Sea
discoveries, and establishing an analytical method to generate cash-flow
data for current development projects, it thus becomes possible to esti-
mate the contribution of known North Sea discoveries as well as future
North Sea discoveries. Necessary elements required for this analysis
include (1) assumptions pertaining to development costs for reserves
of various size, (2) the future price of crude, and (3) the minimum
field size required for development investment under those projected
assumptions.
Assumptions about the future price of crude are relatively straight-
forward. This writer has taken the approach that prices, at least in
the short run, will remain constant in current terms, and thus decline
in real te-ms. Use of the $12 and $7 prices represents two points on
a spectrum of potential prices which can be envisioned as potential con-
servative high prices, (e.g. $12), and minimum acceptable low prices,
(e.g. $7). Attempts by the western governments to establish a floor
price of approximately $7/bbl. also influenced this writer. It does
appear unlikely that prices might erode to a level below $7/bbl. at
any time in the near future.
The use of an apparently low discount rate of 10 percent deserves
additional comment. Considering that this study utilizes the inflated
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cost data previously discussed, it was thought that the use of a 10
percent discount rate would adequately account for a reasonable return
on investment. This may or may not be true in the case of current
development projects. Uncertainties regarding reserve size, well pro-
ductivity, platform durability and safety, and future government policy
tend to push private industry to use much higher discount rates when
evaluating projects. Secondly, by virtue of the approach taken in
this study, future development projects utilize discounted cash-flows
back to the time of their discovery, not to January, 1976. Thus the
contribution of discounted cash-flow to the present value of future
discoveries as well as current discoveries where development is specu-
lative is overly large. The final section of this chapter attempts
to deal with this problem by discounting the cumulative cash-flow of
the North Sea as an additional 10 percent as representative of a more
conservative estimate of the present value of North Sea oil production.
B. Minimum Field Size Required for Development
This writer has taken two approaches to the problem of establish-
ing the minimum field size required for development. The first approach
involves taking available cost data from ongoing North Sea development
and attempting to analyze that data in terms of future development costs
on a disaggregated basis. Assumptions and limitations of that analysis
are given in the following section. The second approach involves a much
simpler empirical analysis of the same data by attempting to relate
reserve size with total development cost using "selected" fields.
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Miminum Field Size Using Disaggregated Costs:
Cost categories used to generate cash-flows for various fields
have been investigated for correlation with reserve size, distance
from shore, depth of production, water depth, and well capacity. The
cost categories, as previously cited, consist of: (1) platform cost
and installation, plus most of the miscellaneous fund, (2) platform
equipment, (3) development drilling, (4) transportation costs, e.g.
S.B.M., pipelines, and terminals, and (5) annual operating costs for
both platform and transportation. The relationships developed were
vague and poorly defined by standard statistical measures. Conclusions
from this approach are thus stated in the form of assumptions regard-
ing various cost categories.
Assumption I: Platform and installation costs are herein con-
sidered as simple functions of water depth, and no consideration has
been given to design differences, environmental requirements, (as in
the more hazardous northern area), or future technological improvements.
It should e obvious that as areal extend of a field increases there
is a concomittant increase in the number of platforms required. Under
optimal trapping conditions one platform should be able to adequately
service a 500 million barrel field. Alternatively, relatively long,
linear reservoirs with less than one hundred million barrels may not
be adequately drained by one platform. Statfjord will require at least
three platforms. For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that
reservoir geometry is such that efficient drainage by one platform is
not a significant problem. Table IX illustrates the derived relation-
ships used to establish platform and installation costs.
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TABLE IX
PLATFORM AND INSTALLATION COST
Water Depth Platform Cost Installation Cost Total
300'/less $ 50 million $25 million $ 75 million
400' 100 " 37.5 " 137.5 "
500' 150 " 50. " 200. "
600' 200 " 62.5 " 262.5 "
Assumption II: Platform equipment appears to be independent of
water depth, and more or less a function of reserve size. This is
assumed to reflect the greater volume of liquids to be processed on the
platform for larger reservoirs. No consideration has been given to dif-
ferent gas/oil mixtures and the problems associated with high-pressure
reservoirs. Both are common problems in the North Sea.
Assumption III: Development drilling is a function of reserve
size, but does not appear to be particularly cost sensitive on a project
by project basis. There is an implicit assumption that smaller reser-
voirs will require more redrills. There is obviously a bg jump in
cost when going from one platform to two or more.
Assumption IV: S.B.M., terminal, and pipeline costs are relatively
fixed and basically reflect reserve size as well as distance from shore.
Where small fields will often use a S.B.M. in conjunction with higher
transportation operating costs, it is anticipated that a number of small
fields will be in close proximity to larger reserves such that spur
lines can be connected with the larger pipeline systems which will be
developed.
-57-
Assumption V: Miscellaneous costs appear to run about 3 percent
of the gross investment outlay. A figure of 3 percent will be used for
all projects formulated here, with 97 percent allocated to platform and
installation costs and the remainder to transportation.
From these assumptions a field size of 150 to 200 million barrels
recoverable reserves would require the following investment outlays:
TABLE X
ESTIMATED INVESTMENT FOR 150-200 MILLION BBL. FIELD
Platform and installation ---------- $75 million to $262.5 million
Platform Equipment------------------- 50 million to 200 million
Development Drilling----------------- 125 million
S.B.M. and Terminal------------------ 45 million
Miscellaneous------------------------ 9 million to 20 million
Total Investment ----- $300 million to $653 million
Total operating costs for fields in this size category appear to
run between $35 and $40 million dollars per year. Approximately 3/4
of the operating costs is normally allocated to the platform operation.
The following section discusses operating costs in more detail.
It can be readily determined from the figures cited above that
platform cost and equipment are the most critical to our analysis of
minimum required field size for development. Unfortunately, we must
also make assumptions about probable water depth for future discoveries
as well as some averaging assumptions about the cost of platform equip-
ment required. For these reasons the following empirical approach
was chosen instead.
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Minimum Field Size Using Empirical Relationships:
Figure 7a shows the results achieved by plotting the log of re-
serve size as a function of investment per barrel of reserves and as
a function of total annual operating costs. Only selected fields were
used, omitting earlier projects such as Ekofisk and Forties Fields,
and concentrating on developing a relationship which would emphasize
financial risk. With the exception of Alwyn, Claymore, and Montrose,
the function shown in Figure 7a approximates a good fit to the data.
The linear function used is:
Log Reserves = 4.12 - .61 (Cap. Inv./bbl. Reserves) (1)
Extra weight was attached to Statfjord, Brent, Hutton, and Cormorant in
order to achieve this fit to the data, and the standard error is large
if all data are considered. Again, this relationship can be considered
as a conservative approach by attaching high investment costs to the
smaller fields.
Operating costs for the smaller fields generally range between
#35 and $40 million dollars per year. Statfjord, Brent, and Ninian
form the basis for establishing operating costs for the larger fields.
The curve for operating cost shown in Figure 7b is adequate for pur-
poses of this investigation and is an "eye-ball" fit.
Table XI summarizes the cost data as formulated on the basis of
the preceeding discussion. As shown in the table, the previous figures
of #300 to #635 million investment costs for a field in the 150 to 200
million reserve category is comparable to the figures of $346 to $59.4
million for fields of 100 and 200 million barrels arrived at with the
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empirical approach. Operating costs for the smaller fields do not vary
significantly from the $35 to $40 million per year previously cited.
The ratio of platform to transportation operating costs range from 1:1
to 4:1, and a ratio of 3:1 appears to represent a good average.
TABLE XI
DERIVED FIELD DEVELOPMENT COSTS
Reserves Investment Platform Op. Cost Transportation Op. Cost
(RESV) (CINV) (COPN). (COTN)
100 X106 $346 X10 6___ $26 X106 ------------ $ 9 X106
200 "----- 594 ----- 26 ---------- 9
300 "----- 819 ----- 30 10
500 "----- 1195 ----- 30 -10
1000 ----- 1880 60 -- 20
2000 ----- 2760 98 ------------ 32
The investment and production profiles previously cited in
Table VI are also used here to investigate minimum field size. These
profiles represent current industry expectations and should be valid
for our purposes. As previously discussed, selection of a appropriate
production profile represents a thorny problem. Production profiles
range from 7 to 17 years, and although the smaller fields tend to have
a shorter duration, there is considerable overlap. As has been discussed
in a previous section, the small fields will maximize cash-flow to the
private company if the peak production is rapidly achieved. Large
per-well flow rates would naturally be advantageous in such situations.
Unfortunately, not all reservoirs in the North Sea can be expected to
possess optimal yield characteristics such that high flow rates can be
sustained. Furthermore, it would seem foolhardy to justify investment
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on the basis of abnormally high flow rates if the production profile
selected would make the difference between commercial and non-commercial
investment. Therefore all relatively small fields of 300 million bar-
rels or less are assigned to a 12-year production profile as a somewhat
conservative approach to the problem.
The average duration between discovery and time of production
start is approximately 5 years, ranging from 3 to 7 years. The deci-
sion to start development investment averages approximately 3 years.
Those averages are used herein. Again the smaller fields may have
longer delays due to uncertainty on the part of the operators as to
commercial feasibility of development.
Utilizing the computational program previously cited, cash-flows
and net present values at various crude prices and various discount rates
were generated using the British Tax System. The present values are
shown in Table XII. In order to formulate a minimum field size for
development, one must first select an acceptable discount rate and a
crude oil price. Two discount rates were chosen: 10 percent and 25
percent. The question can then be asked as to what present value is
necessary in order to satisfy the investor. As previously discussed
in the Chapter on current industry development, a figure in excess of
exploration investment must be obtained, but it seems unrealistic to
use the relatively high hurdle of $136 million dollars, which is the
average industry expenditure for 22 apparently viable fields. Alter-
natively, this writer has used a figure of $50 million dollars, which
is the average exploration cost per 59 discoveries.
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TABLE XII
SUMMARY OF PRESENT VALUES
FOR HYPOTHETICAL NORTH SEA OIL FIELDS
(British Tax System)
Bbls. Reserves
Recoverable Discount $ Price
in Millions Rate CRUDE
Present Value
Private
$ Millions
Present Value
Govt.
$ Millions
100 
200 ---------
300 ----------
500 ----------
1000 ----------
2000 ----------
.1 ------ 12
.1 10
.1 7
.1 1]6
.25 16
.25 12
.1 ------ 12
.1 10
.1 7
.1 5
.25 12
.25 7
.25 16
.1 16
.1 ------ 12
.1 7
.25 7
.25 12
.1 - 2
.1 7
.1 - 12
.1 7
.1 12
.1 7
------- 106.
59.
-42.
185.
71.
40.
------- 303.
229.
98.
-41.
115.
35.
160.
417.
------- 422.
157.
43.
127.
--- 638.
280.
------- 1193.
640.
------- 2244.
1398.
83.
50.
30.
166.
166.
86.
---------- 266
179.
68
46
266.
68.
474.
474.
…---------- 364.
107.
107.
364.
--------- …- 632.
207.
----------- 1521.
506.
----------- 3679.
1393.
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Figure 8 illustrates the derived relationships using the two dis-
count rates cited above. At a price of $12/bbl., minimum field size
varies between 85 and 110 million barrels, whereas at a price of $7/bbl.,
minimum field size varies between 150 and 400 million barrels. The
current industry assessment of minimum field size is variously cited
between 250 and 300 million barrels recoverable reserves. Utilizing
figure 8, this writer has concluded that the minimum acceptable field
size at a price of $12 is thus 150 million barrels, which reflects the
minimum acceptable size if price did fall to the lowest level antici-
pated. The minimum acceptable field size at a price of $7 is arbitrarily
set at 300 million barrels, reflecting . more pessimistic scenario of
high risk and a lowest expected price. Furthermore, one should point
out that these small projects are so price and time sensitive, that a
one to two year depression of prices below those used in these calcula-
tions would have disastrous effects on profitability.
C. Future Development Scenarios
Utilizing the concepts developed for minimum field size acceptable
for development, we can not turn to known discoveries where development
is speculative, as well as to future discoveries and.subsequent develop-
ment. A series of cash-flows, using the British tax system as a basis
for calculation of private and government take, were generated at the
two prices of $7 and $12 per barrel. In the $7 scenario, only fields
of 300 million barrels or greater are included, whereas the $12 scenario
includes fields down to the minimum size of 150 million barrels. The
results of this calculation are summarized in Appendix II.
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Table XIII summarizes the discounted cash-flows into the present
values of current development, speculative development and future dis-
covery development. As discussed previously, a 10 percent discount
rate was used throughout, on a project basis, and does not take into
account future discovery or speculative development timing. Thus the
last two figures shown at the bottom of Table XIII attempt to account
for timing by using another 10 percent discount to derive the present
value of North Sea oil to the private sector.
TABLE XIII
DISCOUNTED CASH-FLOW SUMMARY
$7 Price $12 Price
(in billions of dollars): Private Govt. Private Govt.
Current Development --------------- 27.04 47.25 46.34 103.98
Plus Development, Speculative------ 35.11 55.14 66.76 132.96
Plus Future Discovery Development-- 61.52 83.33 122.48 222.38
Discounted Additional 10% to 1/76-- 30.58 56.25
Figure 9 illustrates the yearly production of oil obtained under
the two price scenarios. Peak production is estimated to occur in 1986
at 6.58 million barrels/day, (the $7 scenario), and could reach as high
as 7.85 million barrels/day, (the $12 scenario).
Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the cash-flow data previously cited.
At the $7 price, peak profits are obtained in 1979 and 1987 for private
investment. Reduced cash flow from 1982 to 1984 is partially the result
of timing of new production and partially an affect of relatively large
outlays for new development. Government cash flow peaks in 1982, and
is considerably less variable as compared to private industry cash flow.
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as compared to private industry cash flow. The contribution of new dis-
covery development is obviously substantial in both instances, thus form-
ing the basis for a more stable utilization of resources by both govern-
ment and industry.
At the $12 price, peak profits are obtained in 1986 by private
industry and 1988 for the host-governments. The relatively greater con-
tribution to government is obvious from the data plots, emphasizing the
benefit that accrues to the government by virtue of the current tax
policy. From these data one could infer that the host-governments have
an obviously vested interest in maintaining a relatively high crude
price as well as encouraging development of the smaller fields.
It should be interjected here that these scenarios account for oil
development only. Of considerable interest would be comparable data
for gas development along with reasonable projections of investment in
new recovery technology. The latter contribution to longevity of petro-
leum production in the North Sea should surely extend private industry
involvement into the 21st cen-ury.
Table XIV summarizes pertinent data regarding production, developed
reserves, and required industry investment for the scenarios developed
in this study. In addition to the estimated $6 billion dollars pro-
jected for exploration outlays, private industry is anticipated to re-
quire between $56 and $70 billion dollars for development of North Sea
oil reserves. Most of this investment is anticipated to occur between
now and 1985, or appoximately ten years duration.
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TABLE XIV
SUMMARY OF NORTH SEA OIL DEVELOPMENT
Current Development:
Peak Production (million bbls/day(year)--- 4.12(198
Total Reserves Developed (billion bbls)--- 14.8
Development Investment ($ billions)------- 16.84
Current Plus Discovered Development:
Peak Production (million bbls/day(year)--- 4.95(198
Total Reserves Developed (Billion bbls)--- 19.4
Development Investment ($ billions)------- 27.02
Current Plus Discovered Plus Future:
Peak Production (million bbls/day(year)--- 6.58(198
Total Reserves Developed (billion bbls)--- 34.4
Development Investment ($ billions)------- 56.26
Total Anticipated Industry Outlay for
Exploration not Included above
($ billions) ------------------------------- 6.0
1)
1)
4.22(1981)
15.1
17.8
5.70(1982)
20.8
33.17
7.85(1986)
38.4
70.13
6)
D. Summary
The preceeding discussion leads to the conclusion that enormous
outleys of investment capital will be required to develop North Sea
petroleum reserves. Assuming reasonable crude prices, i- is antici-
pated that private industry will generate very acceptable returns on
the required investment. One might also assume that a considerable
segment of this return will be reinvested in down-stream opportunities
which arise from this significant new source of petroleum supply.
Private industry investment is estimated to require between $56
and $70 billion dollars in order to earn between $30 and $56 billion
dollars. Government take, assuming a lower discount rate, is estimated
to run between $83 and $222 billion dollars. Peak production of 6.58
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to 7.85 million barrels/day is estimated to occur abour 1986, repre-
senting a total reserve development of approximately 34.4 to 38.4 bil-
lion barrels of oil. Natural gas and oil recovered by tertiary methods
are not included in this total, and can be expected to contribute a sub-
stnatial amount in all respects to both private industry and host-govern-
ments.
The price of crude and the incentive, by private industry, to
develop smaller, apparently marginal fields will substantially affect
both private industry and host-government cash-flow. At the same
time, it should be pointed out that current estimates of ultimate North
Sea potential are highly speculative and may be highly optimistic, es-
pecially regarding undiscovered pool sizes.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
This investigation has attempted to provide a current estimate
of the oil potential of the northern North Sea from which estimates
of exploration investment, development investment, and accruing cash-
flows can be derived. The following findings are cited as the product
of that effort:
(1) By the end of 1975, the northern North Sea has reached an inter-
mediate stage of exploration. Current proven reserves are estimated
at 29.369 billion barrels oil equivalent, of which 22.648 billion
barrels, or 77.1 percent, is oil. Of the 59 discoveries, 8 can be
classified as true gas accumulations.
(2) Undiscovered potential for the area of study is approximately 24.3
billion barrels, giving a most probable ultimate reserve of 53.7 billion
barrels. Depending on minimum commercial field size, recoverable oil
reserves should vary between 33.7 and 39.2 billion barrels. Ultimate
potential, including currently retained government acreage, could
reach approximately 60 billion barrels although considered unlikely.
(3) This writer estimates that some 14.8 billion barrels recoverable
oil reserves are undergoing active development with an estimated
capital investment of $16.8 billion dollars. Peak daily production
is estimated to occur in 1981 at 4.12 million barrels daily.
(4) It can be further estimated that an additional 4.6 billion bar-
rels of reserves are in various stages of evaluation and will probably
be developed. This would yield a total of 1.9.4 billion barrels of
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reserves and a peak production of 4.95 million barrels per day in 1981
with a capital investment of $27 billion dollars.
(5) This writer estimates that current industry expenditure for explor-
ation is on the order of $3 billion dollars, and should reach $6 bil-
lion dollars by the end of 1981. Most of the North Sea reserves should
be discovered by that time.
(6) Cash-flows discounted at a 10 percent rate for current develop-
ment should range between $27 and $46 billion for private industry
and $47 and $104 billion dollars for host-governments. At a $7 price
of crude, discounted government take averages 64 percent, whereas
at a $12 price, discounted government take averages 69 percent.
(7) Analysis of cash-flow profiles indicate that access to crude
supply and development of subsequent discoveries appear to be the
only economic incentives for continuing to operate the smaller fields
after peak production is obtained in a field. Tax policy and high
operating costs relative to productive capacity tend to make small
fields less attractive from N.P.V. comparisons with large fields.
(8) This writer has concluded that the minimum acceptable field size
at a price of $12/bbl is 150 million barrels, which reflects the mini-
mum acceptable size if price did fall to the lowest level anticipated.
The minimum acceptable field size at a price of $7 is arbitrarily set
at 300 million barrels, reflecting a more pessimistic scenario of high
risk and a lowest expected price.
(9) In order to develop current plus discovered plus future discov-
eries, private industry is estimated to require between $56 and $70
billion dollars. Most of this investment, including approximately
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$6 billion additional for exploration, is anticipated to occur between
now and 1985.
(10) Peak production of 6.58 to 7.85 million barrels per day is esti-
mated to occur around 1986, representing a total reserve development
of approximately 34.4 to 38.4 billion barrels of oil. Private indus-
try is anticipated to earn between $30 and $56 billion dollars whereas
government take, assuming a lower discount rate, is estimated to run
between $83 and $222 billion dollars. Natural gas and oil recovered
by tertiary methods are not included here, and can be expected to
make a significant contribution to both private industry and host-
government cash-flow.
(11) Host-government tax policy and the world price of crude will
greatly influence the development of marginal North Sea fields.
Stability of both factors over the next decade will stabilize North
Sea benefits to both private industry and the host-governments.
(12) Although not specifically discussed as a separate section within
the thesis, comments on risk seem appropriate here. Private industry
perception of increased risk include: a) cost inflation at a higher
rate than crude price inflation, b) imposition of a possibly more
restrictive tax policy on the part of the host governments, c) operator
overestimation of recoverable reserves or per-well productivity, and
d) vulnerability of offshore production facilities to sabotage or
natural disasters.
Conversely, private industry might perceive reduction of risk
as consisting of the following elements: a) guarantees of host-
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government leveraging via participation agreements, b) securing of
royalty rebates in critical situations, c) non-recourse loan arrange-
ments, and d) a perception of time as a stabilizing factor where the
investment climate in North Sea petroleum activity allows the pre-
ceding variables to establish continuity.
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APPENDIX TII
CASH-FLOW TO COMPANY (CFC) AND GOVERNMENT (CFG),
AND PRODUCTION ON A YEARLY BASIS (PN),
FOR NORTH SEA OIL (In Millions)
A. CURRENT DEVELOPMENT
$7 Price
CFC PN
-17.5
57.0
527. 7
415.7
1208.7
1869.3
3435.4
4958.1
4298.3
3872.3
1469.0
1579.7
839.1
667.3
638.
832.8
357.5
140.3
41.8
3.9
-141.8
7.6
-17.1
0
38.0
152.0
246.
465.5
732.
1069.
1340.
1495.5
1504.
1403.5
133715
1192.
1024.
851.5
649.5
469.5
336.5
211.
144.
56
35.
5.
CFG CFC
0
38.0
245.7
705.9
1155.4
1795.6
2275.7
2917.3
4277.1
4324.
5017.5
4674.5
4513.4
3919.4
3371.
2840.5
2149.
1462.5
838.2
445.6
213.2
52.9
20.9
-17.
213.
1073.
999.
2198.
3946.
6254.
7445.
6930.
5495.
2894.
2424.
1286.
1149.
1271.
1527.
655.
433.
155.
138.
-56.
25.
-103.
$ 12 Price
PN
5 0
0 38.
1 152.
8 246.
4 465.5
743.2
7 1100.1
1 1387.7
2 1533.6
7 1451.1
4 1440.6
1 1370.
1215.2
1042.6
9 865.4
2 658.8
3 477.3
9 342.7
214.2
3 144.
6 56.
9 35.
5 5.
Year
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
CFG
0
72.9
469.7
1330.8
2153.0
3424.8
5083.3
7555.6
9437.3
10446.6
10830.
10688.6
10088 5
9067.
7096.5
5439.7
4227.3
2881.5
1813.4
1053.7
511.6
189.1
123.5
I _
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APPENDIX II (Continued)
B. DISCOVERED, DEVELOPMENT SPECULATIVE
Year $7 Price $12 Price
CFC PN CFG CFC PN CFG
76 -23.9 0 0
77 -122.6 0 0 -84.2 0 0
78 -317.5 10. 8.4 -393.9 0 0
79 -333.3 69. 57.5 -631.9 66. 93.9
80 ---- 192.8 183. 152.4 ------- 1743.6 319. 458.2
81 1067.6 304. 253.1 3889.9 497. 713.2
82 1852.5 403. 335.7 5520.9 640. 920.7
83 1764.9 453. 377.4 5177.1 476. 1084.
84 1071.7 460. 383.3 2724.5 475. 2432.8
85 ---- 834.5 360. 383.3 ------- 261.4 640. 4220.
86 904.4 360. 383.8 64.0 593. 3953.7
87 400.6 434. 739.4 -121.9 555. 3865.
88 19. 372. 1156.3 196.8 462. 3158.5
89 297. 303. 1164.3 889.2 376. 2557.
90 ---- 551.2 227. 960.8 ------- 619. 282. 2015.
91 72.9 161. 654.1 180.4 189. 1407.6
92 62.5 125. 412.5 312.5 137. 896.5
93 -24.1 86. 266.1 132. 96. 660.
94 -111.4 50. 141.4 -119.9 50. 399.9
95 ---- -77.5 30. 47.6 ------- 33.6 30. 126.4
96 -18.4 10. 8.4 25.4 10. 14.6
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APPENDIX II (Continued)
C. FUTURE DISCOVERY DEVELOPMENT
$7 Price
PN CFG
0 0
0 0
15. 12.5
90. 75.2
255. 213.
515. 430.1
795. 664.
1090. 910.4
1290. 1077.4
1415. 1182.3
1485. 1487.1
1470. 2043.1
1395. 3094.8
1245. 3265.6
1070. 3430.7
850. 3206.3
650. 2535.3
497. 1867.7
345.
235.
160.
75.
40.
15
$12 Price
CFC
-48.6
-361.7
-185.
549.4
2205.7
4817.8
6747.3
9883.9
9491.
6351.7
5230.9
2643.
1286.6
1431.6
1909.6
1528.6
1313.7
1238.5
385.6
189.4
219.1
-43.8
-0.4
38.1
1291.3
721.2
397.
200.8
67.2
12.5
PN CFG
0
0
69.
204.
433.
741.
913.
1408.
1601.
1691.
1719.
1660.
1539.
1353.
1142.
898.
648.
486.
353.
235.
160.
75.
40.
15.
0
0
99.7
295.7
628.9
1077.7
1859.
3178.9
4892.7
8066.1
9181.3
10659.3
10816.2
9610.6
9239.9
6580.1
4962.3
3619.2
2587.9
1558.1
861.
463.8
160.4
21.9
Year 
79
80 ----
81
82
83
84
85. ----
86
87
88
89
90 ----
91
92
93
94
95 ----
96
97
98
99
O0 ----
01
02
CFC
-30.8
-153.8
-452.9
-601.3
-253.4
1079.3
2722.5
4149.3
4661.1
4371..8
4101.9
2831.
1320.
1094.
1049.1
358.9
377.2
442.3
-66.4
-156.2
-117.
-155.8
-107.2
-27.5
.I 
--
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APPENDIX III
Eckbo's Reservoir Development Submodel --
A Brief Description1
The reservoir development submodel is essentially a net present
value calculator. It uses reservoir characteristics as explanatory
variables in a set of functional relationships that determine the
development and extraction costs associated with producing a given
reservoir. A set of production and tax regulations is then applied
to determine the cash flow for the reservoir. In this manner the
submodel checks the economic viability of a discovered field.
Basic elements included in the submodel include: 1) development
costs by categories, 2) estimates of recoverable reserves, 3) formula-
tion of production and tax policies of host-governments, 4) assumptions
regarding investment and production profiles of the reservoir, 5) estimates
of annual operating costs, and 6) assumptions regarding the world price
of crude oil. Options include separate discount rates for private
investment and host-governments.
